Abstract: Agency theory suggests that problems in terms of conflicting preferences, knowledge asymmetry and different attitudes towards risks can have a negative impact on work outcome from the agent to the principal. In private internal investigations, the client is the principal, while the fraud examiner is the agent. Based on a sample of 49 reports of investigation from Norway, this article presents empirical results testing agency theory. Results indicate that agency issues do have a significant influence on the contribution from internal investigations, but the influence is not necessarily negative. While different attitudes towards risk have a negative impact, knowledge asymmetry has a positive impact on the contribution from an investigation. A possible explanation for this surprising result is that examiners are experts in other areas than the client, which is the reason why examiners are hired by clients.
Introduction
The business of private internal investigations by external fraud examiners has grown remarkably in recent decades (Brooks and Button, 2011; Button et al., 2007a; Gill and Hart, 1997; Gottschalk, 2016) . Law firms and auditing firms are hired by private and public organisations to reconstruct the past when there is suspicion of misconduct and potential financial crime (Button et al., 2007b; Button and Gee, 2013; Machen and Richards, 2004; Schneider, 2006; Wells, 2003 Wells, , 2007 Williams, 2005 Williams, , 2014 .
Most reports of investigation are kept secret to the public and often also to the police, even when there is evidence of financial crime by white-collar criminals (Gottschalk and Tcherni-Buzzeo, 2017) . For this study, we were able to identify and retrieve a total 49 investigation reports in Norway for the ten year period from 2006 to 2016.
In this article, we apply principal-agent theory to study fraud examinations carried out private investigators (agents) for their clients (principals). Agency theory suggests that conflicting preferences, differences in knowledge and information, as well as different attitudes towards risk will influence work performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Agency theory is based on the assumption of narrow self-interests for both agent and principal (Bosse and Philips, 2016) .
In this article, we address the following research question: 'How do conflicting preferences, knowledge asymmetry and risk difference in a principal-agent relationship influence the contribution from private internal investigations by fraud examiners?' This research is important, as there is very little empirical research available on private investigations of financial crime.
Agency theory
Agency theory with principal and agent applied to a private internal investigation implies that the client organisation is the principal while the fraud examination firm is the agent (Eisenhardt, 1985) . In agency theory there are three problems: preferences (client and examiner may have conflicting values or goals), knowledge (client and examiner may not have the same information and insights) and risk (client and examiner may not have the same level of risk aversion or risk willingness).
Both principal and agent may behave opportunistically. Agents such as fraud examiners are believed to be rational actors who are interested in maximising their individual utility, even at the expense of the principals. Agents are believed to be opportunistic and a key goal of an investigation mandate is for the principal to manage that opportunism through two major mechanisms: financial incentive and mandate for the examination. However, the self-interest-oriented assumption of agency theory has been questioned in many principal-agent relationships (Dawson et al., 2016) .
Agency theory is among the dominant theories of management behaviour. Challenges arise whenever one party (a principal) employs another (agent) to create value. The interests of the principal and agent may diverge, the principle may have imperfect understanding of the agent's activities and the two parties may have different attitudes towards risks (Bosse and Phillips, 2016) . Risk assessment is dependent on available information (Corelli, 2016; Steen, 2016) .
Common examples of the principal-agent relationship include corporate management (agent) and shareholders (principal), politicians (agent) and voters (principal) and brokers (agent) and buyers (principal). Agency theory describes the relationship between the two parties using the concept of a contract. In fraud examinations, the main contractual arrangement is the mandate that defines tasks and objectives for the internal investigation.
The client defines a mandate for the investigation and the investigation has to be carried out according to the mandate. The mandate tells investigators what to do. The mandate defines tasks and goals for the inquiry. The mandate is an authorisation to investigate a specific issue or several specific issues by reconstructing the past.
The mandate can be part of the blame game, where the client wants to blame somebody while at the same time diverge attention from somebody else (Lee and Robinson, 2000) . Some are too powerful to blame (Pontell et al., 2014) . The mandate can be part of a rotten apple or rotten barrel approach, where attention is either directed at individuals or at systems failure (Punch, 2003) . Anchoring of suspicion can be unintentionally or purposely be misplaced in the mandate.
Reports of investigation
We were able to identify and obtain 49 private internal investigation reports by fraud examiners in Norway, as listed in Table 1 . The client is the principal organisation with its principal business. The agent organisation has conducted the investigation, where the investigation report is listed in the references of this article. Most agent organisations are either law firms or auditing firms. The final column in Table 1 lists crime suspicion that was to be investigated by fraud examiners for the client organisations.
For each report of investigation listed in Table 1 , we have interpreted the extent of:
Furthermore, we have interpreted the extent of contribution from each report of investigation. Contribution is the extent to which investigators created value for their clients in terms of reconstructing the past, answering the mandate and suggesting actions for the future (Osterburg and Ward, 2014) . Figure 1 illustrates our research model to answer the research question: 'How do conflicting preferences, knowledge asymmetry and risk difference in a principal-agent relationship influence the contribution from private internal investigations by fraud examiners?' In the research model, we have introduced a control variable, which is the number of pages in the investigation report. The assumption is that contribution can be just as much explained by the report itself as by issues according to agency theory.
The following research hypotheses are consistent with the research model:
Hypothesis 1 A greater extent of conflicting preferences between client and investigator will reduce the contribution from the investigation.
Hypothesis 2 A greater extent of knowledge asymmetry between client and investigator will reduce the contribution from the investigation.
Hypothesis 3 A greater extent of difference in risk attitude between client and investigator will reduce the contribution from the investigation.
Hypothesis C A shorter report of investigation will reduce the contribution from the investigation.
A scale was applied from 1 (low) via 2 (middle) to 3 (high) for conflicting preferences, knowledge asymmetry and risk attitude difference, as listed in Table 2 . Scores in the table can be defined as expert elicitation where an expert who knows all the reports did the estimation.
Figure 1 Research model to study effects of agency issues on investigations
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Expert elicitation seeks to make explicit and utilisable the unpublished knowledge and wisdom in the heads of experts, based on their accumulated experience as well as their interpretation and reflection in a given context. Elicitation is defined as collecting information from people as part of human intelligence. An elicitation technique or elicitation procedure is applied to collect and gather information from people. Expert elicitation is defined as the synthesis of opinions of experts on a subject where there is uncertainty due to insufficient data (Heyman and Sailors, 2016; Valkenhoef and Tervonen, 2016) . Expert elicitation is a systematic approach to include expert insights into the subject and also insights into the limitations, strengths and weaknesses of published studies [Slottje et al., (2008), p.7] "Usually the subjective judgment is represented as a 'subjective' probability density function (PDF) reflecting the experts' belief regarding the quantity at hand, but it can also be for instance the experts' beliefs regarding the shape of a given exposure response function. An expert elicitation procedure should be developed in such a way that minimises biases in subjective judgment and errors related to that in the elicited outcomes." Meyer and Booker (2001) argue that expert elicitation is invaluable for assessing products, systems and situations for which measurements or test results are sparse or nonexistent. When experts disagree, it can mean that they interpreted the question differently or that they solved it using different lines of thought. Expert judgment can be considered relevant information in the sense that it is data based on qualified opinions. The validity or quality of expert judgment, like any data, can vary. The quality of expert judgment depends on both the completeness of the expert's mental model of the phenomena in question and the process used to elicit, model, analyse and interpret the data.
Research results
First, we establish the extent of co-variation between variables in the research model by calculation of correlation coefficients as listed in Table 3 . The table shows that all three issues in agency theory are significantly related to each other. Preferences with knowledge is correlated at .334*, preferences with risk is correlated at .749** and knowledge with risk is correlated at .290*. Furthermore, Table 3 shows that the contribution from or value of the investigation is significantly related to knowledge asymmetry and number of pages. A greater knowledge asymmetry between client and examiner is associated with a more valuable investigation and an investigation report with more pages is associated with a more valuable investigation.
Next, regression analysis was applied to the research model both without and with the number of pages as control variable. Both models are significant, as listed in Table 4 . While the model without pages can explain 19.7% of the variation in contribution, the model with pages can explain 20.5% of the variation in contribution. In model 1, the quality of the investigation in terms of contribution is positively related to conflicting preferences and knowledge asymmetry. While the first is hard to explain, the second can make sense in that investigators are experts in fields different from clients' expertise. Also the significant relation between risk and contribution makes sense, where there is a negative influence from different attitudes towards risk on contribution. Model 2 indicates that the control variable has no significant impact, since the number of pages is not a significant predictor at p <.05. Both knowledge and risk remain significant, while preference is not significant anymore when compared to model 1.
Since the number of pages as a control variable had no significant impact on regression results, we base our conclusion on model 1. We do not find support for neither hypothesis 1 nor hypothesis 2. On the contrary, we find the opposite of suggested hypotheses to be the case. Both divergences in preference as well as knowledge asymmetry are associated with greater contribution from the investigation. The only hypothesis finding support is hypothesis 1, where empirical results indicate that a smaller extent of difference in risk attitude between client and investigator will increase the contribution from the investigation.
Discussion
There are several limitations to this study. First of all, the study only involves a sample from Norway. We have been unable to find similar samples from other jurisdictions and we have not been able to identify similar studies. Therefore, an attractive avenue for future research is to conduct similar studies in other jurisdictions.
The sample of investigation reports in this study was not conveniently collected nor was a more scientific random methodology in selecting sample cases applied. Rather, we have included all reports of investigations that we were able to obtain. Secrecy and confidentiality characterise the private investigation business and very few reports are made publicly available. This is an obvious limitation as we have no way of telling the extent of generalisability from our study.
In our principal-agent perspective, we find that the quality of the investigation in terms of contribution is positively related to conflicting preferences and knowledge asymmetry. Conflicting preferences can imply that investigators demonstrated independence from their clients by ignoring potential blame games and expected conclusions. Knowledge asymmetry can imply that investigators had expertise in a field unfamiliar to the client and thus useful to the client.
Conclusions
This article has tested agency theory for the relationship between a client and an examiner in private internal investigations where there is suspicion of misconduct and crime. Empirical study indicates that the contribution from an investigation is influenced by agency issues, but not necessarily in the direction suggested by agency theory. The theory suggests that conflicting preferences, asymmetry in knowledge and different attitudes towards risks should all have a negative impact on the contribution from an investigation. Our empirical findings suggest that knowledge asymmetry is beneficial to an investigation, where examiners have different knowledge from the knowledge established by clients. A greater extent of knowledge asymmetry contributes to a more valuable investigation. As suggested by agency theory, different attitudes towards risks have a negative impact on the outcome of an investigation.
